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John Beaumont* Duress as a Defence
to Murder
I. Introduction
It is perhaps not surprising that in an age which has witnessed an
ever increasing amount of terrorist activity, an opportunity should
arise for the courts to examine the present status of the defence of
duress in the criminal law. Such an opportunity was afforded to the
House of Lords recently in Director of Public Prosecutions for
Northern Ireland v. Lynch.'
11. The Facts
The scene was the troubled city of Belfast. On the afternoon of
January 28, 1972, Joseph Lynch drove a stolen car containing three
hooded and armed men to a garage, where an off-duty police
constable, Norman Carroll, was doing work on his car. The three
men ran across the road, gunned down the constable and were
driven away by Lynch in the waiting car. Lynch's story was that
earlier that day he had been summoned to a back room, where there
were three men (Meehan, Bates and Mailey), two of them armed.
There he was ordered first to "hi-jack" a car, which with Mailey he
did, and later to drive it. He drove the three men to a place near
where the constable was stationed. After the killing he drove them
back to their starting point. One of the men in the room and in the
car, he said, was Sean Meehan, a member of the Irish Republican
Army and a ruthless gunman. Lynch testified that Meehan was the
kind of person whom it would be perilous to disobey and that
Meehan had indicated that he would tolerate no disobedience. "You
have no other option. I firmly believe that I would have been shot
for defying him," he said.
Thus, Lynch's main contention was that all that he had done had
been done under duress and that he was therefore entitled to be
acquitted. After a trial before a judge and jury Lynch was convicted
of aiding and abetting the murder, the trial judge withdrawing the
issue of duress from the jury, taking the view that as a matter of law
*John Beaumont, Senior Lecturer in Law, Leeds Polytechnic; Part-time Lecturer,
University of Leeds.
1. [197512 W.L.R. 641; [197511 All E.R. 913 (H.L.).
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the defence was not available on a charge of murder. Lynch was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland upheld this
decision, 2 but certified that two points of law of general public
importance were involved in their decision, and gave leave to
appeal. The two certified points were:
(1) On a charge of murder is the defence of duress open to a
person who is accused as a principal in the second degree (aider
and abettor)?
(2) Where a person charged with murder as an aider and abettor
is shown to have intentionally done an act which assists in the
commission of the murder with knowledge that the probable
result of his act, combined with the acts of those whom his act is
assisting, will be the death or serious bodily injury of another, is
his guilt thereby established without the necessity of proving his
willingness to participate in the crime?
The House of Lords, by a majority of three (Lord Morris of
Borth-y-Gest, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund Davies) to two
(Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Kilbrandon), allowed the appeal
and ordered a re-trial.
III. The Authorities Before Lynch
Duress has long been recognised in English law as a defence to most
offences, not merely as mitigating punishment. The cases are few,
but the defence has been accepted as applying to malicious
damage, 3 receiving, 4 unlawful possession of ammunition,
5 arson,6
conspiracy to steal and larceny, 7 perjury8 and even certain forms of
treason. 9 In Canada the defence has been recognised,' 0 though, as
2. (Unreported) June 27, 1974; see note by D. R. Miers, Duress as a Defence to
Murder (1974), 25 N.I. Leg. Q. 464; O'Donnell J. dissented to the extent that, in
his opinion, the defence of duress is admissible when the charge is one of aiding
and abetting murder.
3. R. v. Crutchley (1831), 5 C. &P. 133; 172E.R. 909.
4. Attorney-General v. Whelan, [19341I.R. 518 (C.C.A.).
5. Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965 (P.C.).
6. R. v. Shiartos (unreported) September 29, 1961 (C.C.A.).
7. R. v. Gill, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 841; [1963] 2 All E.R. 688; 47 Cr. App. R. 166
(C.C.A.).
8. R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 Q.B. 202; [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1047; 56 Cr. App. R. 166
(C.A.).
9. Oldcastle's Case (1419), 1 Hale P.C. 50; M' Growther's Case (1745), Fost. 13;
18 State Tr. 391; R. v. Stratton (1779), 1 Dougal. 239; 99 E.R. 156; R. v. Purdy
(1946), 10 J. Cr. L. 182.
10. For a recent example see Payne, [1974] 2 W.W.R. 658 (B.C. Prov. Ct.)
(escaping from lawful custody in a detention centre).
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will be seen, the Criminal Code specifically excludes it in regard to
several offences. "-
The English authorities are conflicting on whether the defence
extends to murder. The writers are unanimous that it does not. 12 In
several cases judges have expressed similar sentiments, but, with
one exception, 13 all were obiter dicta. 14 They followed the writers,
who in turn followed Hale. It is undeniable that the criminal law has
undergone in this area a process of liberalization since Hale, and has
taken perhaps a more tolerant view of human reactions. It would be
surprising if the institutional writers were to be accepted today
without comment.
As against these older views there is the general statement of
Lord Widgery in Hudson, 15 made after full argument, that the
defence may be admissible in cases of murder other than as a
principal.
It is important in this context to distinguish between the possible
degrees of participation in the criminal law. In English law, prior to
1968, there were four such degrees in the case of a felony: (i)
principal in the first degree, whose act was the most immediate
cause of the actus reus; (ii) principal in the second degree, who was
present, aiding and abetting the principal in the first degree at the
time of the commission of the offence; (iii) accessory before the
fact, who before the commission of the crime advised its
commission or knowingly gave assistance to one or more of the
principals; (iv) accessory after the fact, who gave to a principal
felon or an accessory before or after the fact, any assistance
whatever tending to and having the object of, enabling him to evade
arrest, trial or punishment. 1 6 As a result of the abolition of the
distinction between felonies and misdemeanours by s. 1 of the
Criminal Law Act 1967, accessories before the fact are treated as
principals, and the offence of being an accessory after the fact no
11. Infra.
12. 1 Hale P.C. 50; 4 Bi. Comm. 27; 2 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of
England (New York: Burt Franklin, 1964) at 107.
13. R. v. Tyler and Price (1838), 8 C. &P. 616; 173 E.R. 643.
14. Attorney-General v. Whelan, [1934] I.R. 518 at 526 (per Murnaghan J.); R. v.
Steane, [1947] K.B. 997 at 1005 (C.C.A.) (per Lord Goddard C.J.); R. v. Bourne
(1952), 36 Cr. App. R. 125 at 128 (C.C.A.) (per Lord Goddard C. J.); R. v.
Smyth, [1963] V.R. 737 at 738 (S.C.) (per Sholl J.).
15. [1971] 2 Q.B. 202; [1971]2 W.L.R. 1047; 56 Cr. App. R. 166.
16. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (1st ed. London: Butterworths, 1965) at 68:
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part (2d ed. Toronto: Carswell
Co., 1961) at 346.
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longer exists. 17 It is now usual to refer simply to principals and
secondary parties.
In Canada the modes of participation in crime are laid down in ss.
21-23 of the Criminal Code. A "party" may be the actual
perpetrator of the act, that is, the one who with his own hands or
through an innocent agent, does the act itself; he may be one who,
before the act is done, does or omits something for the purpose of
aiding someone to commit it; he may be one who is present aiding
and abetting another in the doing of it; or he may be one who
counsels or procures the doing of it, or who does it through the
medium of a guilty agent. An accessory after the fact is one who,
"knowing that a person has been a party to the offence, receives,
comforts or assists him for the purpose of enabling him to
escape. "'8
To return to the case law, the nineteenth century case of Tyler and
Price19 is against the admission of the defence. The two accused
were members of an armed gang which under the leadership of a
lunatic named John Thom had gathered to resist the civil authorities.
Thom shot a constable who had come to arrest him and the accused
threw the victim, still alive, into a ditch where he died. The accused
said that they acted under the fear of personal violence from Thom.
The case has been cited as an authority against the availability of the
defence in cases of murder, but it would seem to have no such
effect. There is no indication in the report of any element of duress,
and no attempt was made to establish that the accused could not
escape from the gang. Further, as Professor Glanville Williams has
suggested, ". . . the evidence seemed to show that Tyler had
voluntarily joined a criminal organisation knowing of its purpose;
and one who does this has no cause for complaint if he is debarred
from the defence of duress in respect of threats afterwards made to
him." 2
0
In Ireland the defence has been accepted on a charge of attempted
murder, 21 and in Sephakela v. R. 22 an appeal from the Supreme
Court of Basutoland, the Privy Council by implication recognised
17. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law (3d ed. London: Butterworths, 1973) at 92.
18. Section 22.
19. (1838), 8 C. &P. 616; 173 E.R. 643.
20. Glanville Williams, supra, note 16 at 759-60. This restriction is expressly
stated in the Canadian Criminal Code, s. 17, infra.
21. R. v. Fagan (unreported) September 20, 1974.
22. [1954] Crim. L.R. 723 (P.C.) (Basutoland) and see R.S. O'Regan, Duress
and Murder (1972), 35 M.L.R. 596 at 600-601.
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the plea of duress on a charge of murder, although the evidence
before the court was insufficient to establish the defence. The
authority of Sephakela is, however, somewhat weakened by the fact
that the Privy Council was enunciating Roman-Dutch law, not the
common law.
Outside the United Kingdom, in R. v. Brown and Morley, 2 3 the
prosecution case was that Brown, a lodger in one Elsie Leggett's
house, had agreed to cover Morley's approach to Leggett's
bedroom, which he did by coughing, thus enabling Morley to
murder her there. The Supreme Court of South Australia, by a
majority of two to one, held duress to be not admissible on a charge
of aiding and abetting murder, but a different view has been taken in
South Africa. There, in S. v. Goliath, 24 D and E were walking
together when they came upon the victim, P, whom they asked for a
cigarette and then for money. When P said that he had no money E
stabbed him with a knife and ordered D to tie him up. Being afraid,
D refused whereupon E threatened that unless D obeyed he would
kill him. D then tied P's arms behind his back and E stabbed P
twelve more times from which he died. At their trial for murder, E
was found guilty, but D was acquitted on the ground that he had
acted under E's compulsion. The Appellate Division held, by a
majority of four to one, that compulsion can constitute a complete
defence to a charge of murder.
Several Commonwealth Codes, while admitting a defence of
compulsion by threats, exclude it in cases of murder.25 The
Criminal Code of Canada is representative of these:
17. Compulsion by Threats. A person who commits an offence
under compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous
bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is
committed is excused for committing the offence if he believes
that the threats will be carried out and if he is not a party to a
conspiracy or association whereby he is subject to compulsion,
but this section does not apply where the offence that is
committed is treason, murder, piracy, attempted murder,
assisting in rape, forcible abduction, robbery causing bodily
harm or arson.
This provision follows the report of the Criminal Code Bill
23. [1968]S. A. S.R. 467 (S.C., inbanco).
24. [197213 S. Afr. L.R. 1 (S.C., A.D.).
25. Canada (s. 17); New Zealand (s.24); Tasmania (s.20(1)); Queensland (s.31(4));
Victoria (s.54).
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Commissioners of 187926 which, under the influence of Stephen,
prepared a draft code. The equivalent section of the draft code 27 was
framed to express what was then thought to represent the existing
common law.28 The authority quoted as regards murder is as usual
Hale. Thus, in the Canadian cases the result has been determined by
the application of the Code. For example, in the early case of R v.
Farduto, 2 9 which was cited before the House of Lords in Lynch
itself, the accused, who had a razor, was threatened by one Pardillo
that he would be shot unless he handed over the razor. The accused
did so, and Pardillo used it to kill someone then present. The
accused had no defence to a charge of murder because of the
exclusionary effect of the Code. It did not follow, according to the
court, that compulsion was never an excuse for killing, but the
compulsion must be such as to make the accused person a mere inert
physical instrument, for instance if A by force took the arm of B, in
which was a gun, and therewith killed C. Here A would be guilty of
murder, but B would not. Yet, it is submitted, this purported
exception to the general rule is best put upon the ground, not of
duress or compulsion, but rather on the more fundamental one that
he did no act.
The most recent and authoritative Canadian case is R v.
Paquette. 30 There, two co-accused, Simard and Clermont entered a
store, each carrying a gun, and in the course of executing a robbery,
a customer was shot and killed. Paquette, a former employee of the
store, drove the other two to the premises where the homicide was
effected. The accused was charged with constructive murder, under
s. 213 of the Code, the Crown's case against him being based on the
combined effect of that section and s. 21(2). The latter requires
proof of an "intention in common" with the other perpetrators on
the part of the accused. The defence was one of duress, the accused
contending that he was not guilty of murder because he had not
formed an intention in common with the others to effect the
unlawful purpose of robbery and to assist each other therein, but
rather his participation was by reason of fear of death or serious
bodily harm to himself. On appeal, counsel for the Crown argued
26. (1879), C 2d series 2346.
27. Section 23.
28. See note A at 10 of the report.
29. (1912), 10 D.L.R. 669; 21 C.C.C. 144; 19 Rev. Leg. (N.S.) 165 (Que. Q.B.,
A.D.).
30. (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 1; 19 C.C.C. (2d) 154 (C.A.).
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that s. 17 of the Criminal Code was an exhaustive account of the
circumstances in which compulsion may excuse, 3' that the
exclusion of the offences of robbery and murder from the
application of the section extended not only to a person who in fact
committed the offence but to everyone who became a party to the
offence under the Code. He further contended that where an accused
cannot invoke s. 17 as an excuse for the commission of an offence
he cannot rely on duress or complusion as being relevant to the issue
as to whether the accused had formed a common intention to carry
out an unlawful purpose.
The authority for these propositions was said to be the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunbar v. The King. 32 In that case
the facts were only slightly different and the legal issues identical. It
was held that the compulsion section of the Code, excluding, as it
did, murder and robbery, was inapplicable, and that the argument
that compulsion was relevant to the question of common intention
failed to recognise the distinction between intention and motive.
The Court in Paquette, with regret, felt impelled to follow the
decision in Dunbar, pointing to the harsh consequence that a taxi
driver, who unwittingly picked up persons whom he believed to be
passengers, and then at gunpoint was forced to drive them
knowingly to the scene of the robbery would, if death were to result
as a consequence of that robbery, have no defence to a charge of
murder.3
3
In the United States the courts have generally expressed the view
that duress is not available to one who intentionally kills an innocent
person or who aids and abets such killing. 34 However, these
decisions have usually been placed on other grounds as well, for
instance, that there was an opportunity to escape which the accused
did not take. 35
The only direct English authority is that of R v. Kray.36 One of
several persons charged with murder was Anthony Barry. It was
31. Relying on R. v. Carker, [1967] S.C.R. 114; [1967] 2 C.C.C. 190; 60
W.W.R. 365.
32. (1936), 67 C.C.C. 20; [193634 D.L.R. 737 (S.C.C.), affg [1936] 3 W.W.R.
99; 51 B.C.R. 20 (C.A.).
33. (1974), 50.R. (2d) 1 at 8; 19 C.C.C. (2d) 154 at 161 (C.A.).
34. See e.g. Leach v. State (1897), 42 S.W. 195; State v. Nargashian (1904), 58
A. 953;State v. Weston (1923), 219 P. 180.
35. See e.g. Arp v. State (1893), 12 S. 301; State v. Nargashian (1904), 58 A.
953.
36. (1969), 53 Cr. App. R. 569 (C.A.).
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alleged that he had carried a gun to a house, knowing that Reginald
Kray intended to use it to murder one McVitie there. Barry's
defence was one of duress in that he was in fear for his own safety
and that of his family if he failed to carry out Kray's orders.
Accordingly, the trial judge admitted evidence of the violent
reputation of the Kray twins. The Court of Appeal accepted that
duress can be a defence to a person charged with murder "as an
accessory".
Thus, the Court in Kray drew a distinction between "acces-
sories" and "principals". By the use of the term "accessory", it is
possible that they were referring to the old common law modes of
participation, and, in particular, the accessory before the fact. There
is no evidence that Barry was present or assisting in any way when
the murder was actually committed, but it is submitted that there is
no ground for distinguishing between the man who is forced to carry
a gun to the scene of the crime, as in Kray, and one forced to drive
the killer there. Once the defence of duress is admitted in the case of
an accessory of one kind it is difficult to resist its extension to all
secondary parties. Once this development is made one is forced to
look again at the rationale, if any, of excluding the defence in the
case of a principal.
Kray thus opened the door to a reconsideration of the traditional
distinctions. In the case of secondary parties their Lordships have
ventured boldly through. In the case of the principal the door is now
shut. But not locked.
IV. The Majority Judgments in Lynch
The ratio of Lynch would seem to be that duress is a defence to all
crimes (except possibly treason 37 and murder as a principal) where
the will of the defendant has been overborne by threats of death or
serious personal injury to himself (or possibly another, for example,
wife or child). In the opinion of the majority, there was nothing in
case-law or principle to justify withholding the plea of duress in
cases of murder, at least so far as secondary parties were concerned.
We are here in the domain of the common law; our task is to fit
what we can see as principle and authority to the facts before us,
and it is no obstacle that these facts are new.
38
37. But see supra, note 9.
38. Per Lord Wilberforce at [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641 at 659-60; [1975] 1 All E.R.
913 at 930.
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The reason for the majority view is best expressed by Lord
Morris:
The answer that I would give to these questions is that it is proper
that any rational system of law should take fully into account the
standards of honest and reasonable men. By those standards it is
fair that actions and reactions may be tested. If then someone is
really threatened with death or serious injury unless he does what
he is told to do is the law to pay no heed to the miserable
agonising plight of such a person? For the law to understand not
only how the timid but also the stalwart may in a moment of crisis
behave is not to make the law weak but to make it just. In the
calm of the court-room measures of fortitude or of heroic
behaviour are surely not to be demanded when they could not in
moments for decision reasonably have been expected even of the
resolute and the well disposed.
39
The majority were not impressed with the traditional arguments
against allowing the defence in cases of murder. There were no
reasons of public policy against doing so. It had been argued that it
was very easy for the plea of duress to be raised and difficult for the
prosecution to rebut. But this was also true, in Lord Edmund-
Davies' view, of other well recognised pleas, drunkenness for
instance. 40 Lord Coleridge may have thought the duty of a citizen in
certain situations to be to sacrifice his life, 4 1 but his Lordship
preferred the view of Rumpff J. in S. v. Goliath, 42 that the criminal
law should be more concerned with the conduct of the average
person rather than with his more heroic neighbour.
Lords Morris and Wilberforce would not extend the defence to
murder as a principal, 43 but Lord Edmund Davies thought it
illogical to restrict it to murder as a secondary party, 4 4 when "the
contribution of the secondary party to the death may be no less
significant than that of the principal'' 45 an approach given support
by both dissenting judgments.
46
39. Id. at 646D; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 930.
40. Id. at 685E; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 953E and see Lord Wilberforce, id. at 660E;
[1975] 1 All E.R. at 930H.
41. R. v. Dudley and Stephens (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 273 at 287.
42. [1972] 3 S. Afr. L.R. 1 at 25.
43. See Lord Morris, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641 at 647-48; [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 at
918-19;per Lord Wilberforce, id. at 656; [1975] 1 All E. R. at 926-27.
44. Id. at 688; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 956.
45. Smith and Hogan, supra, note 17 at 166.
46. See Lord Simon, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641 at 666-67; [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 at
936; Lord Kilbrandon, id. at 676; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 945. It has come to the
notice of the writer that the question whether the defence extends to the actual
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Lord Wilberforce would seem to have gone somewhat further
than the rest of their Lordships by saying that:
Nobody would dispute that the greater the degree of heinousness
of the crime, the greater and less resistible must be the degree of
pressure, if pressure is to excuse.
47
There may be much to be said for this view that in the case of more
trivial offences a less serious threat than one of death or serious
personal injury should suffice. On this view, if D were to break a
window under the threat of a less serious assault, or of his watch
being smashed, then there would be a defence of duress available to
him on a charge of criminal damage. Yet how does this fit in with
the ratio of Lynch? It is submitted that it directly conflicts with the
restriction to threats of death or serious bodily harm imposed by the
majority, a restriction which is also accepted in the earlier
authorities. 48
The question of duress of course involves consideration of the
extent to which the accused placed himself under another's
domination and how far he might have withdrawn himself from the
situation. Nothing in the majority judgments affects this question in
any way. The same applies to the question of proof. The evidential
burden is carried by the accused, the burden of proof remaining
throughout on the prosecution. 
49
In view of the majority holding, the second certified question did
not call for direct decision. Four of their Lordships were content to
hold that the crime of aiding and abetting another to commit a
crime, while requiring some proof of mens rea, did not involve a
"specific intent". 50 Lord Simon limited the latter term to an ulterior
intent. 51 A crime is often so defined that the mens rea includes an
intention to produce some further consequence beyond the actus
reus of the particular crime, for example, in burglary it is not
enough that the accused intended to enter a building as a trespasser.
He must also have the ulterior intent to commit one of a number of
perpetrator of the killing is at last to be considered. The Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council will shortly be asked to decide the point in an appeal from Trinidad
and Tobago, sub nom. Abbott v. The Queen.
47. Id. at 656D; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 927B.
48. See the discussion in Smith and Hogan, supra, note 17 at 167 and the cases
cited therein.
49. R. v. Gill, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 841; [1963] 2 All E.R. 688; 47 Cr. App. R. 166;
R. v. Bone (1968), 52 Cr. App. R. 546 (C.A.).
50. Lord Wilberforce makes no mention of the second certified question.
51. [1975]2 W.L.R. 641 at 672; [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 at 941.
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specified offences in the building. 52
V. The Dissenting Judgments
The possible criticisms of the majority position are all explored by
Lord Simon of Glaisdale in a detailed and vigorous dissent. His
Lordship agreed with the majority that any sane and humane system
of criminal law should be able to allow for situations such as the
present one, and yet disagreed as to the best way of achieving the
necessary flexibility. Would it not be preferable, Lord Simon asked,
to allow a general plea in mitigation in the case of duress rather than
a narrowly based and arbitrarily defined defence? 53 In duress
situations both actus reus and mens rea were present. The mind was
"guilty" albeit to a lesser extent than one acting under no such
constraint.54 Was not, he continued, the rationale of duress as a
criminal defence that an act prohibited by the criminal law may be
morally innocent? The way to deal with this was by mitigation of
sentence, or the use of discretion by the prosecution or the Parole
Board, or by the exercise of the prerogative of mercy in appropriate
cases. 55 In the case of murder where the penalty was mandatory,
Lord Simon saw another way of achieving the required flexibility:
the law made a "concession to human frailty" in the case of
provocation by allowing it to reduce the crime of murder to that of
manslaughter. In his Lordship's view, it should make such a
concession in the case of duress. 56
The difficulty that arises with this kind of reasoning is that any
court needs to be aware of the extent of the blameworthiness of the
defendant before it can assess the appropriate sentence. The
question of duress is likely to be of the utmost importance in this
connection. If this issue is to be withdrawn from the jury, then this
52. Lord Simon's suggestion might perhaps introduce some certainty into this area
of the law, although the term "specific intent" is a notoriously imprecise one in
English law. It has been used most frequently in connection with the defence of
drunkenness: see e.g. R. v. Lipman, [1970] 1 Q.B. 152 (C.A.); Bolton v. Crawley,
[1972] Crim. L. R. 222 (D.C.); R. v. Burns (1974), 58 Cr. App. R. 364 (C.A.);
R. v. Sheehan and Moore, [1975] 2 All E.R. 960 (C.A.); R. v. Majewski, [1975] 3
All E.R. 296 (C.A.). For a discussion of the various interpretations of the term, see
R. Cross, Specific Intent, [1961] Crim. L.R. 510.
53. [1975 2 W.L.R. 641 at 662,670-71; [1975)1 All E.R. 913 at 932,939-40.
54. Id. at 669; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 938; and see Lord Kilbrandon, id. at 677;
[1975] 1 All E.R. at 945.
55. Id. at 662; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 932.
56. Id. at 670-71; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 639-40; and see Lord Kilbrandon, id. at
667; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 945-46.
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body, the arbiter on questions of fact, would be prevented from
deciding what may perhaps be the most important fact in the case,
from the point of view of sentence. 57 Of course, in sentencing
judges frequently rely on matters of fact not before the jury, but the
question of duress would seem to be of such fundamental
importance as to make it essential that it be considered first by that
body. Further, Lord Simon's advocacy of a general plea of
mitigation might be more justified if the defence of duress were to
be very broadly defined. Where, however, the threat is confined to
one of death or serious personal injury, as at present in English law,
then this argument loses much of its force.
Lord Simon accepted that duress had long been recognised as
defence to some crimes and that it was too late for the judges to
overturn this and substitute a general plea in mitigation.58 Yet, it is
this very question of authority which, in his Lordship's view, forms
the basis of the most powerful argument against the majority
reasoning. The writers and commentators (all under the impression
that they were stating the common law) were unanimous that duress
was no defence to murder. The draft code of 1879 and the
Commonwealth Codes were to the same effect. Were all these
authorities to be swept aside? What, he asked, was said to counter
them? Merely a Roman-Dutch authority, a dissenting Australian
judgment, a passing reference in a Privy Council case, an
unreported case from Northern Ireland, and a case of an accessory
before the fact where the issue was virtually uncontested.
There is considerable force in this criticism, but perhaps Kray,
the one direct English authority, is treated somewhat peremptorily
by Lord Simon. There, it is true that the contrary point was not
argued, but the Court would only have reached the conclusion that
the defence was available to an accessory if well satisfied that it was
correct, since if they were wrong in their view, much highly
prejudicial evidence had been wrongly admitted against the Kray
twins, the principals to a charge of murder.
57. For a discussion of a similar problem in connection with offences of strict
liability, see T. B. Hogan, Criminal Liability Without Fault (Leeds: Leeds
University Press, 1969) at 8-10; see also Lockyer v. Gibb, [1966] Crim. L. R. 504
(Q.B.); R. v. Warner, [1967] Crim. L.R. 529 (C.A.) and the commentaries
thereon; and see Lord Wilberforce, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641 at 660; [1975] 1 All E.R.
913 at 930.
58. [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641 at 671-72; [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 at 940-41; and see Lord
Kilbrandon, id. at 675; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 943.
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The Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland), 1945, s. 37(1)
(which re-enacts identically an equivalent provision in English
law) 59 gives a defence to a wife who proves that she acted in the
presence of and under the coercion of her husband but makes an
exception of murder.60 Lord Simon argued that if Parliament
intended to exclude murder from the defence of coercion, it would
be anomalous to hold that duress could excuse murder. 61 Yet if, as
seems likely, the defence of coercion is wider than that of duress,
62
why should the same principles necessarily apply to both? The best
approach to this notoriously obscure provision is perhaps to regard it
as "merely an incomplete statement of the common law and the
common law still exists to supplement its deficiency." 6
3
VI. Lynch and the General Defence of Necessity
The final point made by the minority was that the question of duress
could not be considered without examining the concept of
"necessity" generally. Necessity in law, said Lord Simon, denoted
a situation where circumstances faced a person, with a choice
between two evils, one involving an infringement of the criminal
law. 64 It had been rejected in the criminal law generally, his
Lordship stated, and there was no distinction in principle between
necessity and duress.
The only difference is that in duress the force constraining the
choice is a human threat, whereas in necessity it can be any
circumstance constituting a threat to life (or, perhaps, limb). 65
Lord Simon considered, therefore, that duress was merely a
particular application of the doctrine of necessity. Dudley and
Stephens66 had established that necessity was no defence to a charge
of murder. In order to allow the appeal, in his Lordship's view, the
House would have to overrule Dudley and Stephens or say that it did
59. Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 86, s. 4 7 .
60. And treason.
61. [1975]2 W.L.R. 641 at 671-72; [19751] All E.R. 913 at940-41.
62. See Smith and Hogan, supra, note 17 at 169; cf. the discussion in Glanville
Williams, supra, note 16 at 764-67.
63. Glanville Williams, supra, note 16 at 765; see Lord Edmund Davies, [1975] 2
W.L.R. 641 at 685-86; [1975] 1 All E. R. 913 at 953-54; Lord Wilberforce, id. at
659; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 929-30; Lord Morris, id. at 652; [1975] 1 All E. R. at
923.
64. Id. at 665; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 935.
65. Id. at 667; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 936.
66. (1884), 14Q.B.D.273at287.
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not negative necessity. If the latter course were taken, the elements
of "necessity" as a defence would have to be defined.
67
Again, whatever the force of Lord Simon's approach in principle,
the courts have in practice generally recognised a distinction
between the two pleas. Thus, duress has been accepted as a defence
to larceny,6 8 but "economic necessity" is said not to excuse such
an offence. 
69
In their recent consideration of both defences 70 the Law
Commission agreed that the elements of the defences were not the
same and accorded separate treatment to each of them. The Law
Commission could see no social purpose to be served in excluding
the defence of duress in relation to murder 71 and proposed that the
defence should be available on any charge. 72 Likewise, there should
be a general defence of necessity, available where "the defendant
himself believes that his conduct is necessary to avoid some greater
harm than that which he faces." ' 73 The harm to be avoided "must,
judged objectively, be found to be out of all proportion to that
actually caused by the defendant's conduct."
74
The defence of necessity is always popular as an academic
notion, but the problems of its practical definition and application
are well recognised. 75 To draw the traditional distinction between
human and other threats may be intellectually unsatisfying, but
precision and certainty are perhaps no lesser values in a modern
system of criminal justice.
According to the majority Dudley and Stephens stands
undisturbed as a result of Lynch. Lord Morris saw no reason to
question the law as laid down there. 76
VII. Postscript
Unfortunately, not all stories have happy endings. Some twelve
67. [1975]2 W.L.R. 641 at 666-67; [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 at 935-37; and see Lord
Kilbrandon, id. at 675-76; [1975] 1 All E.R. at 944-45.
68. R. v. Gill, [1963] 1 W.L.R. 841; [1963] 2 All E.R. 688; 47 Cr. App. R. 166.
69. 1 Hale P.C. 54; 4 B1. Comm. 31 and see Southwark London Borough v.
Williams, [1971] 2 All E.R. 175 at 179 (per Lord Denning M.R. obiter).
70. The Law Commission, Working Paper No. 55, Codification of the Criminal
Law (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1974).
71. Id. at 16-17.
72. Id. at 17, 19.
73. Id. at 38; and see 29-30.
74. Id. at 38; and see 30-31.
75. See e.g. the discussion in Smith and Hogan, supra, note 17 at 161-64.
76. [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641 at 651; [1975] 1 All E.R. 913 at 922.
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weeks after the House of Lords' judgment was delivered, Lynch
was again convicted after a no-jury trial, 77 held in camera. Lord
Justice Jones ruled that in his view the defendant was "in on the
venture", maybe not as a member of the Irish Republican Army,
but as a supporter who had no hesitation in assisting others. He
found Lynch a very unsatisfactory witness, thoroughly unconvinc-
ing and "prepared to lie his way out of a position in which he found
himself."
78
Thus, according to the Belfast Telegraph, Joseph Lynch has
found himself the holder of a most unenviable record, the first man
in Northern Ireland to be tried, convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment twice for the same murder.
77. In the interim period between the first and the second trial the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 was passed. Section 2 of this Act provided that
trials of scheduled offences (which included murder) should be by a Judge of the
High Court, or a County Court Judge, sitting alone with no jury.
78. Belfast Telegraph, June 3, 1975 at 11.
